About Plato's Philebus - [PDF Document] (2024)

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ABOUT PLATO'S PHILEBUS *Jacob KleinTo speak about a Platonicdialogue, about a Platonic dialogue, meansto do violence to it. Asense of guilt will, therefore, be a continuous sourceof painwithin me while I am speaking. But I cannot resist the temptationtoshed some light some moonlight, as it were on the Philebus. 1hopeyou will forgive me 1 cannot for sounding extremely pedantic,forspeaking much longer than I should, and for making it sometimesverydifficult for you to follow.Let me state five basic points onwhich my talking about the PhilebuswiU rest.First: a Platonicdialogue is not a treatise or the text of a lecture; it isnotcomparable in this respect to a work of Aristotle or, for thatmatter,to any of Plotinus's Enneads as edited by Porphyry. APlatonic dialogueis usually a drama, a mime, in which what happenscannot be separatedfrom what is said and argued about.Secondly:however serious the purpose and the content of a Platonic

dialogue, its seriousness is permeated by playfulness; indeed,as we canread in the sixth letter attributed to Plato, seriousnessand play are sisters.The comical aspect of a Platonic dialogue cannever be completely disregarded.

Thirdly: no Platonic dialogue can be said to represent whatmight becalled and has been called the "Platonic doctrine." Thedialogue may wellhint, though never "with perfect clarity1,"atgenuine and ultimate thoughtsof Plato, the thinker. The Sophist,for example, does that most certainly.But an unimpeachable sourceprovides us with more direct informationabout Plato's thinking thanhe himself ever put down in writing. Thissource is Aristotle, whospent twenty years at that place of leisure, theAcademy, and heardwhat Plato himself said. I assume that we have to pay

attention to Aristotle's reports, never forgetting thatAristotle has his ownway of describing other people's thoughts, apeculiar terminology rooted inhis own thinking and not in thethinking of those other people about whomhe reports.Fourthly: inthe last two centuries scholars, not all, but most of them,havetried to understand the Platonic dialogues as belonging todifferentstages of a"development" in Plato's own thinking. Now, itis of coursepossible that Plato, in his long life, changed hisviews on many andperhaps even on most important points. But tofollow a Platonic dialoguemeans to take it as it is, as one whole,in which the interlocutors play a

* A lecture given at St. John's College, Annapolis, Maryland, onMay 20, 1971.i Soph. 254 C.158 Interpretation

definite and unique role and in which what is said and what ishappeningdoes not depend on anything that is said and is happeningin any otherdialogue. Before we could understand any"development"in Plato'sthinking, it is incumbent on us to understand eachdialogue in its ownterms. This understanding is not helped byassigning a dialogue to acertain period in Plato's life. Yet, inthe case of the Philebus, it will not beunimportant to take noticeof the time this dialogue was written not in

order to track some"developmental" deviation in Plato'sthinking, butmerely to establish whether certain statements in thedialogue may refer

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to somebody's conspicuous behavior within the Academy in Plato'slaterdays. And, happily enough, there is general agreement that thePhilebusis a late dialogue, although some of the reasons for thisdating might bequestionable.Fifthly: every word in a Platonicdialogue counts, and for somebody inthe dialogue to remain silentmay count even more. That's why talkingabout a dialogue mustnecessarily remain insufficient.And now let us approach thePhilebus. The conversation takes placein Athens; we do not learnexactly where; it may be at a gymnastic schoolor at a wrestlingschool. What we read is a part of a very long conversationwhichbegins some time in the afternoon. There are threeinterlocutors:Socrates, Protarchus, Philebus: many young men, halfa dozen or a dozenperhaps, are listening. Socrates is, well,Socrates a man devoted toinquiries and discussions and a friend andlover of youth. Protarchus isthe son of a well-known Athenian,Calhas. Philebus is not known at all.He is one of the fewpersonages in the Platonic dialogues, like Callicles,Diotima,Timaeus, invented by Plato; if they do not remain nameless, liketheStranger from Elea and the Stranger from Athens, their namesare

appropriately coined. The name of Philebus indicates that he isa "lover ofyouth"as Socrates is. Philebus seems to be young, butslightly older thanProtarchus and all the listening young menaround them.2

The title of the dialogue as it has been handed down to us isPhilebus.This title is never mentioned in the writings of Plato'scontemporaries.Aristotle refers to what is said in the dialogue atleast eight times, mentioning Plato once. There seems to be noreason, however, to doubt that thetitle "Philebus" is genuine.Moreover, there is one good reason whichspeaks forcefully for itsauthenticity. The dialogue contains 2,369 hnes(I did not countthem, but somebody did). Of these 2,369 lines only 23are spoken byPhilebus (those I counted). He raises his voice altogetheronly 14times. Under these circ*mstances, who else but Plato could have

chosen the name of Philebus for the title of the dialogue? Therewill bemore to say about this matter later on.

The main question raised in the dialogue is: What is the besthumanlife? And this question has to cope primarily with theall-pervasive feelinga 16 B.A bout Plato's Philebus 1 59ofpleasure, common to all living beings haunting, filling, mockingus.All of us without exception want to be pleased in thousandsandthousands of different ways: we seek to lie down or to sitcomfortably;we hke hearing things that flatter us; we enjoy goodcompany, witty words,good drink and food; we delight in traveling,in going to the theatre or

to the movies, in looking at beautiful things; we love caresses,preciousgifts, wild emotions; we loose ourselves with rapture inexerting power,in sexual satisfaction, in ecstasies, and so on, andso on. A list ofpleasures like the one I have just given is not tobe found in the dialogue,but an infinite number of possiblepleasures is implied in the argumentswe are facing. It is Philebuswho looks at Pleasure as the highest good,who sees in Pleasure notonly the best of human possessions, but thegoal after which allliving beings strive. Pleasure (f|5ovr|) is the goddesshe worships.And quite a few of us, I think, follow him.Socrates does not. Hecontends that there is something better and moredesirable thanpleasure, to wit, thoughtfulness in deciding how to act(to(poovetv), the apprehending of what is intelligible only (tovoeiv), the

power of memory (to fteuvrio-'dai) and that which is akin tothese, rightopinion (56|a opdr)) and true calculations(odry&Eig Xoyiauni); but Socratescarefully adds that thesepowers are better and more desirable than

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pleasure for those beings who are able to share in these powers;only tobeings who have this ability will these powers beprofitable, now and inthe future.

This juxtaposition of both contentions, of that of Philebus andof thatof Socrates, is made by Socrates very shortly after we beginreading. Itis introduced by Socrates with the foUowing words: "See,then, Protarchus,what the assertion is which you are now to acceptfrom Philebus, andwhat our assertion is, against which you are toargue, if you do not agreewith it. Shall we give a summary of eachof them?" 3 These words arethe very first words of the dialogue.But what strikes us immediately isthat they cannot be understood asindicating the beginning of a conversation; they just continue whatwas said before; if they were thebeginning of a conversation, thevocative nocoTcipxe would be precededby co (cb nrjcuTarjY,> notsimply notbxaQxe); and the words"then"(Sf|) and"now" (vuvi) wouldnot be used. Listen again: "See, thenProtarchus, what the assertionis which you are now to accept from

Philebus . . . The dialogue has no true beginning. Nor does ithave atrue ending. This is the last sentence we read, spoken byProtarchus:"There is still a little left, Socrates; you willcertainly not give up beforewe do, and I shall remind you of whatremains." We do not yet understand why the dialogue has nobeginning and no ending. But we see (andthis is important), when webegin reading, that Protarchus has to takeover the thesis upheld byPhilebus. More about that later.Enjoyment and thoughtfulness arethe two banners that Protarchus ands il A.160 Interpretation

Socrates are respectively waving. The life of pleasure and thelife ofthoughtfulness face each other. But it becomes clearimmediately thatSocrates is considering some other life superior toboth of them.4 He willkeep reverting to this third life. It willfinally be described in the lastpages of the dialogue.What followsthe juxtaposition of the two views, that of Philebus andProtarchuson the one hand and that of Socrates on the other, isSocrates'insistence that pleasure has many different aspects: "For,when you justsimply hear her named, she is one thing, but surelyshe takes on all sortsof shapes which are, in a way, unlike eachother."5 Socrates gives twosimple, though significant, examples:the pleasures of a hcentious man are

very different from those of a self-restrained man, who enjoyshis veryself-restraint; the pleasures of a fool are very differentfrom those of athoughtful man, who enjoys his very thoughtfulness.No, says Protarchus,the sources of pleasure may be different, mayhave an opposite character,but "how can pleasure help being of allthings most like pleasure, that is,hke itself."6 Yes, saysSocrates, color and figure are what they are, butcolors and figurescan be very, very different and even, in the case ofcolors, mostopposed to each other, like black and white. Protarchus doesnot seehow this could make him change his mind. Socrates tries forthethird time, this time incisively, anticipating what will be saidlater in thedialogue. No argument, he says, disputes that pleasantthings are pleasant.But Protarchus's contention, which upholdsPhilebus's conviction, implies

that all pleasant things are good. That's what is wrong.Pleasant thingsare for the most part bad and only some are good.But you, Protarchus,says Socrates, call all of them good, althoughyou might be forced by the

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argument to agree that they are otherwise different. Protarchustacitlyadmits that pleasures may be very different from each other,and evenopposed to each other, but sticks to his main point thatpleasures, inasmuch as they are pleasures, are always good.At thispoint Socrates goes back to his own contention, namely,thatthoughtfulness (q)o6vr|0ig) and the apprehension of theintelligible (vovq)are good. He adds to these for the first timeknowledge (Ejucnfpr|)and predicts that many kinds of knowledge willcome to the fore, someamong them unlike each other. Should it turnout that some are evenopposed to each other, could he, Socrates,then cling to the point that allknowledge is alike and not unlikeProtarchus "save himself" in anabsurdity?Protarchus is pleased thatboth, his assertion and that of Socrates,receive the same treatmentand is now willing to grant that there are manydifferent pleasuresjust as there are many different knowledges (we haveto note that hedoes not mention opposite pleasures and knowledges).4 11 D.s 12C.

12D/E.About Plato's Philebus 161Socrates is satisfied withProtarchus's concession about the manynesswithin knowledge andwithin pleasure and speaks as follows: "With noconcealment, then,Protarchus, of the differentiation within my good andwithin yours,but facing it squarely, let us be bold and see if perchance,onexamination, it will tell us whether we should say that the goodispleasure or thoughtfulness or some other third thing."7 It is thesecondtime that Socrates reverts to the possibility that somethingthird may bethe best of human possessions. He proceeds bystrengthening this statement by an assertion which has a wide, widerange.

This is one of the transitions in which the dialogue abounds.(Paren

thetical remark: in the 2nd century A.D. Galen wrote a treatiseentitled"On the transitions in thePhilebus,"which is unfortunatelynot extant).Let me say a few words about the transition we are nowfacing.Up to this point the talk was about things most familiar toall of us,about pleasure and about thoughtfulness and aboutknowledge, this lastword taken in its colloquial and vague sense.The talk was concernedabout our lives in this our world. WhatSocrates is undertaking now is tolift the conversation to a levelof all-embracing universality, disregardingpleasure and knowledgealtogether. He will come back to them after a

short while and then launch out to an even higher level. Whydoes he dothat? The answer is: to find the ultimate sources of whatis so close to usand usuaUy unquestioned by us. The dialogue seeksto link the mostcommon to the most uncommon and fundamental. Tofind the link willrequire a great deal of vigoronSocrates'part.

The manyness within pleasure and within knowledge leadsSocratesto remind Protarchus of the "astounding"assertions that"many are one"and that "one is many."9 There is nothingparticularly surprising anddifficult about these assertions if theyrefer to visible and tangible things,

which come into being and perish. A man, for example, is one,but he isalso many, because he has many members and parts. But whenwe consider intelligibles, the eISt] of things, the "invisiblelooks,"

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which can beencountered only in speech (iv Wyco), and each oneof which is one andunique, the "one and many"problem becomesextremely perplexing(Socrates mentions four of the intelligibles:the One Man, the One Ox,the One Beauty, the One Good). That's wherethe trouble sets in. Anyyoung man, says Socrates, challenging thosepresent, any young man, oncehe has tasted the flavor of thatperplexity and thinks he has found atreasure of wisdom, does notspare anyone, neither himself, nor his parents,nor any human being,who can hear him, and joyfully sets every possibleargument inmotion, confounding everybody. Protarchus feels hit. "Do younotsee,Socrates," he says, "how many we are and that we are allyoungmen? Are you not afraid that we shall join with Philebus andattack you,7 14 B.8 14 C.162 Interpretation

if you revile us?"9 But Socrates' challenge works. Protarchuswants

Socrates to find a better road than was used up to now and tolead themon.Socrates retorts that there is a better road, which healways loved, whichis easy to point out, but very difficult tofoUow. Whatever human art hasdiscovered had been brought to lightthrough it. Socrates' description ofthis better road marks a newtransition in the dialogue.Socrates calls this road a "gift of godsto men,"which we owe to somePrometheus together with some gleamingfire (let me remind you: Prometheus stole the fire he gave to men).The ancients, who were better thanwe and lived nearer the gods,says Socrates with deadpan seriousness, havehanded down to us thetradition that all the things which are ever saidto exist aresprung from One and Many and have, inherent in their nature,

Limit (jtspac;) and Infinitude (cuiEtpia). We shall come back tothis pointin a little while. What Socrates emphasizes now is thatwe must, in everycase, look for one eI8o? (he uses the word Ibeahere) and next for two, ifthere be two, and if not, for three orsome other number; and we musttreat each of these t'ibt] in thesame way, that is, subdivide each of them,"until we can see thatthe original one is not just one and many andinfinite, but also howmany it is." 10 Then we may bid farewell to infinity,bid fareweU tothe ibia of infinity.Protarchus wants Socrates to clarify what hehas said. No wonder!Socrates provides this clarification bypointing to the letters of the alphabet.

The sound which we emit through our mouth can be called one, yetit is

infinite in diversity. A god or a godlike man, as an Egyptianstory teUs,observed, however, that there are distinct vowel sounds,semi-vowelsounds and consonants in Greek 7 vowels, 3 semi-vowels orsonants(X, p, a), and 14 consonants, more exactly 10, if we includethe roughbreathing sound h and exclude the 5 double consonants.This means thatbetween the oneness and the infinitude of soundthere are definite numbersof sounds. One has to know all of them topossess the art of reading andwriting. Socrates emphasizes thenumbers of sounds and letters. But thisexample of the alphabet andthe example of the numbers of musical intervals, which Socratesalso gives, are meant to let Protarchus and Philebusand usunderstand that there are numbers in the realm of the zlbx\. Laterinthe dialogue " Socrates will clearly distinguish between numbersof un

equal units, that is, numbers of sensible things, and puremathematicalnumbers of units, that is, of units which do not differat all from eachother. But we learn from Aristotle 12 that Platoalso spoke of eidetic

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numbers, of numbers of units which are themselves nothing butilbr\.To try to find them means to embark upon that better, butdifficult road.16 A.to 16 D.n 56 D-E.12 See esp. Met. XIV, 3, 1090b 32ff.About Plato's Philebus 163Protarchus and Philebus do notunderstand what is going on. Philebusespecially does not see whatthe theme of numbers, which Socrates hasinjected into thediscussion, has to do with the alternative of pleasureandthoughtfulness, which was in question. Socrates reminds him thattheywere wondering how each of them, pleasure as well asthoughtfulness,was one and many, and whether "each of thempossessed a numberbefore becoming infinite," ,3 that is to say,whether there were t'ibx\ ofpleasure as well as of thoughtfulness,which then are dispersed amongbeings that continually come intobeing and perish and that live their livesin pleasure andthought.Protarchus is perturbed. He understands what Socrates isafter. He

cannot find an answer to the question. He wants Philebus toanswer it.And he formulates the question as follows: "I thinkSocrates is asking uswhether there are or are not elbt\ ofpleasure, how many there are and ofwhat sort they are, and the sameof thoughtfulness." u Philebus does notutter a word. But Socratesremarks: "What you say is most true, son ofCallias." 15 Heunderscores the importance of this fact by addressingProtarchusceremonially as son of Callias.Protarchus is intent on bringing thediscussion about pleasure andthoughtfulness to a satisfactory end.We learn from what he says thatSocrates promised that he would stayon and not go home before thisend was reached. This promise musthave been given, we have to assume,during the discussion whichpreceded what we read in the dialogue, and

we should not forget that. Protarchus demands that Socrates stopperplexing him and the other young men and decide either to dividepleasure andknowledge into their ei8t| himself or to let that go,if there be some otherway to solve the matters at issue among them.Socrates is willing to do thelatter, and this marks a newtransition in the dialogue.Socrates claims playfuUy that some godhas just reminded him ofsome talk about pleasure andthoughtfulness, which he heard when hewas dreaming or perhaps whenhe was awake. What he heard was thatneither pleasure northoughtfulness was the good, but some third thing,different fromboth and better than both. We remember, of course, thatSocrateshimself had intimated this twice. He does it now for the third

time. If this could be clearly shown now, says Socrates,pleasure wouldnot be the victor and it would no longer be necessaryto divide pleasureinto its ei8t). And Socrates adds that, while thediscussion proceeds, thiswill become still clearer.What foUowsleads to three insights: (1) it is the lot of the Good andonly ofthe Good to be self-sufficient; (2) if we take the life of pleasureandthe thoughtful hfe separately, so that the life of pleasure istotally divestedof any thought, any knowledge, any opinion, anymemory, and theis 18 E.19 B.15 Ibid.164 Interpretation

thoughtful life, on the other hand, totally untouched by anypleasure,both lives in this bare form cannot be conceived asself-sufficient, as

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desirable and as good; (3) only a life made up of a mixture ofpleasureand thoughtfulness and sharing in both will be the kind oflife everybodywould choose. Let me remark that Socrates and alsoProtarchus list underthe powers associated with thoughtfulness thepower of apprehending theintelligibles, vov which in commonparlance may simply mean goodsense. This term will now play acentral role for quite a while. Socratesconcludes: it has beensufficiently shown that Philebus's goddess, Pleasure,cannot beconsidered identical with the good. Thereupon Philebus raiseshisvoice: "Nor is your vov; the good, Socrates; it will be open to thesameobjections.'16 Let us hear Socrates'reaction: "My voiigperhaps, Philebus;but not so the true vovc,, which is also divine;that one, I guess, is different.I do not as yet claim for the vovgthe prize of victory over the combinedlife, but we must look andsee what is to be done about the secondprize." " Socrates goes on,still speaking to Philebus: "Each of us mightperhaps put forward aclaim, one that vovg is responsible for this combinedlife, is itscause, the other that pleasure is: and thus neither of thesetwowould be the good, but one or the other of them might beregarded as the

cause [of the combinedlife]." ,8 Then, turning to Protarchus,Socratesclaims he might keep up his fight against Philebus in aneven strongerway and might contend "that in this mixed life it isvotjg that is more akinand more similar than pleasure to that,whatever it may be, which makesthat life both desirable andgood."As to pleasure, he adds, "it is fartherbehind than the thirdplace, if my yovc, is at all to be trusted at present." 19

The emphasis in this passage is clearly on the terms voiigand"cause"(amov). What remains unclear is the sense in which theterm "cause" isto be taken and the rank to be attributed ultimatelyto the voiig. And letus not for a moment forget Socrates'

own voijg.Socrates suggests that it might be better to leavepleasure and not topain her by testing her in the most precise wayand thus proving her inthe wrong. Protarchus disagrees. Socratesasks whether Protarchus disagrees because he, Socrates, spoke ofpaining pleasure. It is the secondtime that pain is mentioned inthe dialogue. It is done jokingly. Painwas mentioned for the firsttime when Socrates dealt with the thoughtful life, totallyuntouched by pleasure. The way he put it then was this:"Wouldanyone be willing to live possessing thoughtfulness and voiigandknowledge and perfect memory of all things, but having no share,greator small, in pleasure, or in pain, for that matter, but beingutterly un

affected by everything of that sort?" 20 The question, which issupposedis 22 C.it 22C-D.is 22 D." 22 E.20 21 D/E.About Plato'sPhilebus 165to be negated, when put in this form actually involvesa difficulty: onewould perhaps be willing to accept a thoughtfulpleasureless life, whichdoes not involve us in any pain. The thirdtime pain will be mentioned isgoing to show pain as a closecompanion of pleasure and as a real evil.Protarchus says he is notshocked by Socrates'

phrase "paining pleasure,"but rather by Socrates'apparentattempt to stop talking about pleasure

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altogether and because Socrates does not seem to understand"that notone of us will let you go yet until you have brought theargument aboutthese matters to an end."21 This is the second timeSocrates is warnedabout leaving too early.Whew, Socrates exclaims,and predicts that a long and difficult discussion hes ahead ofthem. To fight the battle of the voiig for the secondprize requiresnew weapons in addition to those already used. A newbeginning hasto be made, and this will mean a new transition in thedialogue.Letus be on our guard in making this beginning, says Socrates, andweshould indeed pay attention to these words. Socrates suggeststhateverything that now exists in the world be distributed in atwofold, orrather in a threefold way. The results of thisdistribution are very differentfrom each other. They are called bySocrates, indiscriminately and unprecisely,tlbr\ or yivt], which Ishall translate by the word"tribes." Thefirst two have beenmentioned before as a kind of Promethean gift: the"limitless" (toaraipov) and the "limit" (to jtEpctg). The third is the mixture

of these two into one. This is not to be taken literally, as weshall see ina moment: let us be on our guard. And now Socratesadds: "But I cuta considerably ridiculous figure, I think, when Iattempt a separation intotribes and an enumeratio22n.P"rotarchuswonders why. Socrates: "Itseems to me, a fourth tribe isneededbesides." 23 It turns out that Socratesmeans the cause of thecommixture of those first two. And Protarchus, whois eager tosupply even a fifth, namely the power of separation, is toldinaffable words that this fifth is not needed now, but that if itbe neededlater, he should excuse Socrates for going after it. Thementioning ofProtarchus's proposal and the way of handling it casta doubt on thenecessity of the fourth tribe, the cause. There mightbe something strange

and even ridiculous indeed about that. We should be on ourguard.Let us consider one of the first two tribes, namely tocbtEipov. Thefollowing English translations are all adequate: thelimitless, the endless,the boundless, the unlimited, the infinite,the innumerable, the indefinite.the indeterminate. And we must notforget the hom*onym cfatsipog, meaningthe inexperienced one, uponwhich word Plato does not fail to pun. 24As to the second tribe, tojtspag, the "limit," it becomes almost im-21 23 B.22 23 D.23Ibid.24 17 E.

166 Interpretation

mediately apparent that, although Socrates keeps using thisterm, he alsosubstitutes for it the phrase "that which haslimit,"to jtspag evov, that isto say, the"limited." Protarchus andthe other young men as weU as weare somewhat confused. Socratesproposes to investigate how each ofthem, the "limitless"and the"limited,"are both "one and many"; for hecontends that each one ofthem is split up and scattered into many. He

starts with the "limitless,"warning Protarchus again: "What Iask you toconsider is difficult and

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debatable." 25Here are special cases of this tribe, parts of itsmanyness: "hotter andcolder," "quicker and slower," "greater andsmaUer," "exceedingly andslightly," "excessive andlacking." 26 Ineach there is "the more as well asEach of them is constantlyadvancing theless" (to uaXXov te vxxi t|ttov).and never stationaryin sharp contrast to what is determined by a fixednumber, by just"that much": if such a number advances, it ceases toexist. Whatcaptures our attention is the expression to \1aXk6v te xaitJttov.

This expression is meant to gather together the tribe of the"limitless"andto put upon it the seal of a single nature. 27 It isused six times in thepassage we are now considering and once moremuch later on. Once theparticle te is omitted. This omissionfocuses our attention on the use ofthis particle in all the othercases. The verbs related to this expression areall in the dual. AndSocrates summarizes pointedly: "By this argument thehotter and itsopposite become together limitless." 2S The "hmitless" is a

pair. The expression "the more as well as the less,"as the sealof a singlenature, seals a duality. And this duality remainscompletely indeterminate.

The "limitless" is an indeterminate pair.But what about the"limit,"on the one hand, and the "hmited," that"which has limit,"onthe other? Let us take the "limited" first. It is, asSocrates quiteclearly states, 29 contrary to "the more as well as the less";it isthe equal, and equality, the double, and any number in firmrelationto another number or a measure in firm relation to anothermeasure, thatis, everything which "puts an end to the variabilitybetween the opposites

and makes them proportionable and harmonious by the introductionofnumber." 30We understand that what Socrates means by this tribeof the "limited"is what we read in the Fifth Book of Euclid'sElements. This book is inall probability either a perhaps somewhatcondensed copy of an originalwork of Eudoxus or imitates this work.Who is Eudoxus? He was born inCnidus, on the shores of Asia Minor,came to Athens and stayed at Plato'sAcademy for a while. He was anastronomer, a mathematician, and a25 24 A.2 "Lacking" is notmentioned. It is lacking in deed.27 25 A.

28 24 D.28 25A/B.30 25 D/E.About Plato's Philebus 167geographer;he firmly established the doctrine of ratios andproportions,including those of numerically incommensurablemagnitudes; he tried to"mix" the ei8r|, as understood by Plato,with all the sensible things;and what is most important to us hedeclared pleasure to be thesupreme good. But pleasure was not hisgoddess, as she is for Philebus.Eudoxus, as Aristotle reports,"seemed to be a man of exceptionaltemperance, and hence he wasthought to uphold this view not becausehe was a lover of pleasure,but because it seemed to him that it was so in

truth." 3i Socrates, as we see in the dialogue, disagrees.Thetribe of the "hmited" then consists of ratios. The tribe ofthescattered

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"limitless,"of the araipov, in its infinite manyness found itsunityin the seal of "the more and its opposite," 32 that is, in"the more as wellas the less." The tribe of the "limited," themanyness of determinate ratios,has not yet found its unity. Thisunity was only postulated, was only, asSocrates says, "referredto." There was indeed a direct "reference" to the"limit" itself(Eig to itepag). 33 And Socrates concludes: "The limit didnotcontain a multitude nor did we feel a difficulty that it mightnot be oneby nature3.4"It is at this point that we might turn toAristotle's reports about Plato'sunwritten words to confirm what wefound in the dialogue and to wingreater clarity.In the SixthChapter of the First Book of the Metaphysics 35 Aristotlesays ofPlato: "It is peculiar to him [i.e., Plato] to posit a dualityinsteadof the single Limitless, and to make the Limitless consistof 'the Great andthe SmaU.' " In the Third Book of the Physics,where Aristotle discussesthe aitEipov at great length, we read inthe Fourth Chapter 36 again: "ForPlato there are two Infinites,'the Great and the Small.' " We see thus

confirmed what we read in the Philebus, except that Aristotle,in his ownway, uses the words"great"and"small"without theircomparativeforms. 37 He keeps using these words, in speaking aboutPlato, at manyother places. But, what is more important, in BooksXIII and XIV ofthe Metaphysics Aristotle mentions several times two"elements,"as heputs it, out of which, according to Plato,"numbers"are derived. We

have to understand that Aristotle has in mind "eidetic numbers,"assemblages of 6i5t). These two sources are the "indeterminatedyad" (f| dopiOTog8vfxg) and the "one" (to ev). We recognize theindeterminate pair of thePhilebus in the "indeterminate dyad," theduality of the Limitless, "themore as well as the less." But we seenow that what was named thesi Arist. Met. XII, 8, 1073 b 17ff.;Proclus, In Eucl. Comm. (Teubner) pp. 67,2ff.; Arist. Met. I, 9,991 a 14f.; Nic. Eth. X, 2, 1172 b 9ff.32 26 D.33 25 B.34 26 D.35987 b 26-28.

s 203 a 15.37 Cf. 37 C end.168 Interpretation

"Limit" in the Philebus can also be named the "One." WhatAristotlecalls the "elements"can be called the ultimate sources ofeverything, thatwhich has the first rank both as beginnings and asruling powers. That iswhat is meant by dpxr), in common parlance aswell as in most thoughtfulspeech. We should not assume, I think,that Plato had a definitely fixedname for each of these dpxat. Theterms the Good, the One, the Preciseitself, the Same, the Limit,and perhaps the Whole are aU suited to one

of the dpxai, depending on the context in which they are used.As to thenames of the second ao/i], the "indeterminate dyad," "themore as wellas the less,"

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and the Other (which also implies a duality 38) seem aU ofthemno less suitable. In the Philebus Socrates, in putting a sealon the tribe ofthe cbiEipov, makes its intrinsic characterperfectly clear. But the characterof the jtspag, the"limit,"remains obscured.Now let us take up the third tribe, the"mixture"of the "Limitless"andof the "Limit." What does "mixing"here mean? It means that the twodpxai, the "Limitless," the"indeterminate dyad,"and the "Limit,"the"One,"exert their power oneach other. What happens then may bedescribed as follows. The"indeterminate dyad" duplicates the "One," thatis to say, producestwo entities, two i8r|, duplicates each of theseei8t| we may alsosay"divides"

each of these i8r| and keeps on duplicating we have to assume upto a certain point. In Aristotle's reportsthe "indeterminate dyad"is explicitiy characterized as a "doublingpower"(8uojtoiog). 39 Itis the ultimate source of definite manyness, of"numbers," in therealm of the Ei8n as weU as in our world. In the earlierpassage,when Socrates first introduced the Promethean giftof"infinitude"and of"limit"and urged that in every case a definitenumber of tibr\ hadto be found (the alphabet helping him to clarifythis point), there washardly a discernible hint that the"Limitless"

with its doubling power isresponsible for the multiplicity ofthe ei8i> You wiU remember that inthis context the "limitless,"the infinite, was ultimately dismissed. Not soin the world in whichwe live. What happens here is this: the "Limit,"the "One,"transforms the "indeterminate dyad" into a determinate one,that isto say, transforms the two constantly and indeterminatelychangingterms of the dyad into two stationary and determinate onesand keepsdoing this, produces, in other words, a multitude ofratios. That's whySocrates can call the manyness of ratios "theoffspring of the limit." 40We understand now what confusedProtarchus and us when Socratessubstituted "that which haslimit,"

the"limited," for the "limit" itself.The "limited,"theassemblage of ratios, is already a part of the mixture,of the thirdtribe. But it represents a mixture, or rather mixtures, of aspecialkind, mathematical partnerships that can give to parts of theworldwe live in a certain Tightness, remove the excess andindefiniteness,ss Cf. Soph. 255 D and 256 E-257 A.so Met. XIII, 7,1082 a 15 and 8, 1083 b 36.25 D.About Plato's Philebus 169andproduce balance and right measure. 41 Such mathematical partner

ships engender, for example, health, establish the entiregenuine art ofmusic, bring about the temperate seasons and all thebounties of our world,beauty and strength of the body, and all thebeauties of the soul. And

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Socrates, addressing Philebus directly and speaking about thatproperpartnership (6p0f| xoiycovia)42 of mathematical ratios, hasthis to say:"For this goddess, my beautiful Philebus, beholding thewanton violenceand universal wickedness which prevailed, sincethere was no limit ofpleasures or of excess in them, establishedlaw and order [vo^og xai Ta|ig]in which there is limit. You say sheexhausted us; I say, on the contrary,she kept us safe."43 Socratesaddresses Philebus, but we cannot helpthinking of Eudoxus. Philebusremains completely silent. Socrates turnsto Protarchus: "How doesthis appear to you,Protarchus?" AndProtarchus answers: "It is verymuch how I feel, Socrates." 44Let us conclude: the common power ofthe two dpxai determines themixture. Sometimes the community ofthis power is lacking.Socrates turns now to the fourth tribe, thecause. You wUl rememberthat Socrates seemed somewhat reluctant toadd this fourth to the firstthree. And indeed, is there any needfor it? The common power of the"Limitless'

and the "Limit"appeared as the cause of the mixture and ofwhatis engendered in this mixture. Listen now to Socrates'words:"ShouldI sound a false note if I caUed the fourth the cause of themixtureand generation?" 45 And listen to what Socrates one momentearlier sayswith regard to all the first three tribes: "That whichfabricates all these,the cause, we call the fourth, as it has beensufficiently shown to bedistinct from the others."46 That has notbeen shown at all! How canultimate sources, dpxi, be caused bysomething else? If that were so, thefirst two tribes, the"Limitless"and the "Limit,"

would not be what theyare.

The exploration of this fourth tribe, the "cause," is leftpending, andSocrates makes a new transition, which helps him toturn backwards.What was the purpose, he asks, of coming to thepoint they havereached? They were trying to find out whether thesecond prize belongedto pleasure or to thoughtfulness ((ppovnaig).They had posited, Socratesreminds Protarchus and us, that the mixedlife was the victor. We cansee now, he continues, to which tribe itbelongs, namely, to the thirdtribe, formed by the mixture of allthat is "limitless"and all that is

"bound by the limit." 47 And now Socrates asks Philebus to whichof the41 26 A.42 25 E.43 26B-C.44 26 C.45 27B/C.46 27 B.47 27 D.170Interpretation

three tribes his life of unmixed pleasure belongs. The fullquestion is this:have pleasure and pain a limit or are they amongthe things which admit

"the more as well as the less?" Philebus's answer is: "Yes,among thosewhich admit the more; for pleasure would not be aU thegood, if it werenot limitless in multitude and in the 'more.'"48Socrates dryly replies:

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"Nor would pain, Philebus, be aU the evil." 49 This is how painis introduced in the discussion for the third time, and this timedecisively. ForSocrates adds he would grant Philebus that both,pleasure and pain, arein the tribe of the Limitless. We notePhilebus meant only pleasure, notpain.Socrates'addition isdecisive.Pleasure and pain are a limitless pair. One of theconsequences of thisfinding is that there are no ei8t| of pleasure,in the strict sense of this word.We remember that Socrates hadintimated that the discussion would showin a clearer way why itwould not be necessary to divide pleasure into itsei8t)- Socrateswill use this term later on in discussing pleasure, but it wiUnothave to be taken in its strict sense.

The next question Socrates asks Protarchus and Philebus is: towhattribe thoughtfulness, knowledge and voiig shall be assignedwithout impiety.Socrates explains: "For I think that our risk isnot a small one in findingor not finding the right answer to whatis being asked now."50 PhUebus:"You exalt your own god, Socrates,you

do." 51 Socrates: "And you yourgoddess, my friend. But thequestion calls for an answer, aU the same." 52Protarchus intervenesand urges Philebus to answer. Whereupon Philebussays: "Did you not,Protarchus, choose to reply in my place?"53 This isthe last timePhilebus raises his voice. Let us look back for a moment.At thebeginning of our reading we learn that Protarchus willdefendPhilebus's thesis of pleasure, because Philebus himself, asProtarchus says,"has growntired" (the Greek word is d^EipnxE, a punon the wordditEtpov). A little later Philebus has an opportunity toregret that he spokeup again and calls upon his own goddess towitness that he does regret.When the "one and many"question comesup, Protarchus remarks: "It is

perhaps best for the inquirer not to disturb Philebus in hissweet repo5s4 e."And now he wiU be silent aU the time, even whenpleasure, his goddess,is thoroughly discussed. What is he doing aUthis time? Just listening?Protarchus has some difficulty inansweringSocrates' last question,namely, to what tribe knowledgeand vor>g should be assigned, and asksSocrates to answer thisquestion himself. Socrates is wiUing. He declares:48 27 E.49 28A.50 Ibid.si 28 B.

52 Ibid.63 Ibid.54 15 C [tacit reference to the proverb: \ii\xiveiv xccxdv eu xeijievov].About Plato's Philebus 171"What youenjoin me to do is not difficult,"55 and he repeats: "Itiseasy."Let us be on our guard. All wise men agree, and therebyreallyexalt themselves, says Socrates, that voiig is king of heavenand earth.Socrates adds: "Perhaps they are right." 50What foUows isindeed an easy, but not too convincing"cosmological"account, whichends with the statement that voiig belongs to that of thefourtribes which was called "the cause of all." 67 Notice, please,again,

"of all."And Socrates adds: "Now, you have at last youranswer."Protarchus: "Yes, and a very sufficient one; and yet youanswered withoutmy noticing

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affection, that the body cannot, therefore, be pained orpleased. Pleasureand pain belong to the soul, and to the soul only.But sometimes, or ratheroften enough, as in the case of hunger andthirst, the body is involved.Whenever this is the case, we face onekind of pleasure and pain.Another kind of pleasure and pain doesnot involve the body at all. Itarises within the soul itself as thesweet and cheering hope of pleasantthings to come and as thefearful and woeful expectation of painful thingsto come. Both thepleasant and the painful expectations originate withinthe soul inmemory. Socrates proceeds to give a circ*mstantial descriptionofthis origin by passing from perception to memory, to forgetfulness,torecollection, and finally to desire. But he ends this passage byrevertingto pleasure and pain that involve the body. He points to aman who issi 31 B.62 31 D.63 Ibid.About Plato's Philebus 173emptyand suffers pain, but who, because of his memory, hopes to befUledagain and enjoys this hope. "At such a time, then, a man, orany

other living being, has both pain and joy at once.*"4 If,however, an emptyman is without hope of being filled, a twofoldfeeling of pain arises inhim. The stress is on the duality ofpleasure and pain. The possibility of atwofold pain and althoughthis is not mentioned of a twofold pleasureemphasizes the dualityeven more. Let us not forget its ultimate source.Looked at in thispassage is also a life in which there is no feeling ofpleasure orpain at all, but only thoughtfulness and voiig. Such a hfe hadbeenconsidered much earlier in the dialogue and had been rejectedastotaUy undesirable, lacking self-sufficiency and, therefore,goodness. NowSocrates calls it "the most divine life." Protarchuschimes in: "Certainlyit is not hkely that gods feel either joy orits opposite." 65 And Socratesagrees: "No, it is very unlikely; foreither is unseemly for them." Socrates

adds that they may consider this point later on, if it wouldhelp theargument; they might give voiig credit for it in contendingfor the secondprize. We shall be watching.A new transition takesplace. What follows can be subdivided into threeparts, and thetitle that can be given to all of them is "On false pleasures."

This is what happens in part one: Protarchus is unwilling toagree thatpleasures and pains could be false; he accepts thepossibility of falseopinions, but rejects the possibility of falsefears, false expectations, andfalse pleasures; a lengthy discussionfoUows which culminates in theassertion that a "just, pious andgood man,"a "friend of the gods,"has"true pleasures," while an"unjust and thoroughly bad man"can only

have "false pleasures," which imitate the "true pleasures" tothe pointof ridicule; and the same can be said of pains. 6aThis,now, is what happens in part two: we are reminded that pleasureandpain are a hmitless pair tied to "the more as well as the less";anyone who feels pleasure in any way always really feels pleasure;but thesepleasures may be felt as present pleasures and also aspleasures to be feltin the future; the latter ones may be falsebecause they may not come intobeing as expected, not as great andintense as expected; and when, in ourfeelings, we are trying tocompare pleasures with pleasures, or pains withpains, or pleasureswith pains, we may reach entirely false results, becauseof thelimitless and indeterminate character of both, pleasure andpain.

The third part of this passage does not concern false pleasuresdirectly,

but rather pleasures falsely understood or falsely judged. Thetheme ofpleasure and pain is a common topic in Plato's own time,widely discussedby outstanding men. One of the opinions aboutpleasure, rejected by

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Socrates, is that freedom from pain is identified with pleasure.For somemen this opinion amounts to the firm denial of theexistence of pleasures64 36 B.65 33 B.m 39E-40C.174Interpretation

altogether. For them that which Philebus and his friends caUpleasuresare merely escapes from pain. These men are men "of harshjudgments." 67Socrates does not mention any names, but it is highlyprobable thatAntisthenes is one of these men. Antisthenes isreputed to have said:"Should I ever meet Aphrodite, I wouldstrangle her with my ownhands."I have condensed this passage of thedialogue to the utmost. But youunderstand that it chaUenges theconviction of Philebus radicaUy. Let uslook at him again. He hasnot said a word. Is he reaUy listening? We know,he had grown tired.Has not his sweet repose mentioned by Protarchus along time agotransformed itself into sound sleep? And sleep, sound,

dreamless sleep, we should observe, excludes any feeling ofpleasure andpain, brings about, in other words, a condition of the"most divine life,"yet a condition not compatible with Philebus'sown aspirations. Yes, therehe lies, the beautiful Philebus, withclosed eyes and closed ears, whileSocrates continues the inquiry,imposed upon him by Philebus, Protarchus,and the other young men.In sharp contrast to Philebus's fatigue andsomnolenceareSocrates'vigor and straightforwardness. 68A subtle transition isbrought to pass inasmuch as Socrates takes thosem*n "of harshjudgments"with whom he disagrees as allies. He is going

to describe more accurately what pleasure means to these men,whooppose it or deny its existence. We have already seen that painand joycan be felt at the same time. The point is now emphasized:pain andpleasure do not only constitute an indeterminate pair, butthey also mixwith each other. This is again shown by Socrates in atripartite way. Somemixtures of pleasure and pain are those inwhich both pleasure and pain,involve the body, as, for example,itching and scratching, which Protarchustends to consider a "mixedevU."69 Some mixtures are those in which thebody and the soulcontribute the opposite elements, "each adding pain orpleasure tothe other's pleasure and pain," 70 as, for example we haveheardthat before a man suffers from thirst, is pained by bis bodily

emptiness, but rejoices in his hope to be filled, a hopeentertained only byhis soul. The third kind of mixture is the mostimportant; it is the onein which the soul and only the soul isinvolved. Socrates gives as examplesof pains belonging to thisthird kind: anger, fear, longing, mourning, love,

jealousy, envy and hy asks: "Shall we not find them full ofineffablepleasures?" 71 He then refers in one sentence only toanger and tomournings and longings in order to show the mixture ofpain and ofpleasure in them. Protarchus fully agrees.Socrates'nextquestion is: "Andyou remember, too, how people, at tragedies, enjoythe spectacle and atthe same time weep"! 72 "Yes, certainly," saysProtarchus. Whereupon

67 44C-D.68 See, for example, 34 D 4-8 and 38 B 3-4.es 46 A.

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70 47 C.7i 47 E.72 48 A.About Plato's Philebus 175Socrates asks:"And the condition of our souls at comedies do you knowthat there,too, there is a mixture of pain and pleasure?" 73Protarchus'sanswer is: "I do not quite understand." Socratesconfirms that it is noteasy to understand such a condition undersuch circ*mstances, and Protarchus, on his part, confirms that itis not easy for him. It is not easy for useither.

This is the short beginning of the discussion about the thirdkind ofmixture of pleasure and pain, which involves only the soul.And now,surprisingly, Socrates launches into a lengthy explanationof what happensto spectators at comedies. It takes no less thanfour pages, and ends withSocrates'contention that pain is mixedwith pleasure not only forspectators in the theatre, wheretragedies and comedies are performedbut also "in ah the tragedy andcomedy of

life." 74 Today, we are proneto caU any horrible or simply sadevent a"tragedy"and a funny one a"comedy." But that was not done inancient times. The expression"tragedy and comedy oflife" in thedialogue is highly unusual and evenparadoxical. It is almostunique; a somewhat similar phrase referring totragedy, not tocomedy, can be found only in Plato's Laws. 75 Why is thisexpressionused in the Philebus? Let us hear what Socrates says.He takes upenvy first. Envy is a pain of the soul, but we also see anenviousman rejoicing in the evils that befall those close to him. Thus

envy is both pain and pleasure. Socrates then takes up theridiculous. Theridiculous is in the main the consequence of adisposition in the human soulwhich contradicts the famousinscription at Delphi. A ridiculous man isa man who does not knowhimself. This folly of not knowing oneself canhave three aspects:(1) the conceit of being richer than one is; (2) theconceit ofbeing more beautiful than one is; (3) the conceit of beingmorevirtuous than one is, especially wiser than one is (8oooo(pia).This thirdkind of conceit is the most numerous. Now, we tend tolaugh at men thusconceited. But two cases must be distinguishedhere. Those who arelaughed at may be strong and able to revengethemselves, and are thenpowerful, terrible, and hateful; for follyin the powerful is hateful and

base. Or they are weak and unable to revenge themselves, andthen theyare truly ridiculous. When we laugh at the follies of suchmen, who may beour friends, we feel pleasure. But to feel pleasureat the follies of ourfriends is what envy brings about, since it isenvy that makes us rejoicein the evils that befall these ourfriends, and envy is painful. Therefore,when we laugh at what isridiculous in our friends, we mix pleasure andpain.It is not quiteclear how all this explains what happens at comedies,althoughProtarchus appears to be satisfied. Socrates adds that all thatwassaid by him so far concerned only envy, mourning, and anger (he73ibid.74 50 B.

75 817 B.176 Interpretation

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omits longing, which was also mentioned by him in that onesentencehe uttered before passing on to tragedies and comedies).And now,Socrates declares, he need not go further and Protarchusought to acceptthe assertion that there are plenty of mixtures ofpain and of pleasure.But now something extraordinary happens thatsheds more light on thetheme of comedy.

You wiU remember that the young men, who surroundSocrates,extracted from him the promise not to go home beforebringing thediscussion about pleasure and thoughtfulness to asatisfactory end. Andyou wUl also remember that Protarchus, lateron, reminded Socrates ofthis promise and assured him that not oneof the young men would lethim go before the end of the discussionwas reached. Listen to whatSocrates says now: "Tell me then: willyou let me off, or will you letmidnight come? I think only a fewwords are needed to induce you tolet me off."76 How strange! Why onearth does Socrates utter these words?Is this the Socrates who isknown for his never abating eagerness todiscuss things? Has hegrown tired like Philebus? Or is it that envy hasentered not onlythe Xoyog but also the stage, the "comedy of

life"presented in the dialogue? Incredible as it might seem,Socrates appears tobe envious seeing Philebusasleep,"divinely"asleep, without pleasureand pain. 77 Does that notmean that Socrates is pained by this envy andyet also pleased bythe ridiculous aspect of Philebus's sleep, whichmanifests thelatter's "conceit of wisdom," the 8o|o0ocpia of friendPhilebus? Butwhat about us, who read or hear the words of the dialogueand arethe spectators of this "comedy of life"? Well, we are puzzledandpleased by realizing that Socrates of all people is envious atthis moment,and we are also pained by witnessing what happens tohim. We might

refuse to accept that this is what is going on at this moment,but thisrefusal would only mean that we expect to be pained andpleased, // weaccepted it.

Yes, the dialogue is pleasurable and painful in deed (Epycp), inadditionto dealing with pleasure and pain in speech (Xoyco). And isthere any needto mention the pain and the pleasure one feels inreading, or listening to,the dialogue in all its deliberatelycomplex and inordinate convolution?We understand now, I think, whythe title of the dialogue is Philebus.Socrates proceeds, of course.He takes up now and this is a newtransition the pure pleasures,that is, pleasures unmixed with pain.Socrates lists five kinds ofsuch pleasures, four of them conveyed to us by

our senses, one involving that which cannot be sensed. The firstfourkinds of pure pleasure have their source in beautiful figures,in beautifulcolors, in clear sounds and in many odors. Thebeautiful figures are notbeautiful living beings or paintings, but"says the argument" 78 a50 D.77 Cf. Apology 40C-E.78 51 C.AboutPlato's Philebus 111straight Une drawn with the help of a ruler, acircular line drawn with thehelp of a compass, plane figures drawnwith the help of these same tools,and solid figures constructedwith the help of suitable instruments. 79 Thebeautiful colors arepure colors, in which there is no trace of any other

color. Clear sounds are those that send forth a single puretone. Thepleasures these figures, colors, and sounds generate arepure pleasures,unmixed with pain. As to the pleasures of smell,they are, as Socrates

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and the use of ingenious instruments play a much greater role inthem.It is at this point that Socrates divides the arts of countingand of measuring (not, however, that of weighing) into two kinds.Some counting refersto visible and tangible units, which are allunequal; but there is alsocounting of units that do not differ atall from each other. This kind ofcounting is the basis of the trueart of numbering, of true "arithmetic."

The art of measuring may also refer either to visible andtangible thingsor to entities that cannot be sensed. To measure,and to deal with, thelatter entities means to be engaged in"geometry,"not for the purpose ofproduction and trade, but for thepurpose of knowing. And this holds alsofor the careful study ofratios and proportions. These true arts of numbering and measuringserve education and nurture. We see that there is akind ofknowledge purer than another, as one pleasure is purer thananother.This purity of knowledge brings about much greater clarityandprecision and much more truth.But there is, beyond that puremathematical knowledge, the power ofdialectic. It deals with Being,True Being, with that which always im

mutably is. Protarchus remembers at this point the claim ofGorgias thatthe art of persuasion, the rhetorical art, surpassesall other arts. Socratesreplies that he was not thinking of the artthat surpasses all others by beingthe"greatest," the "best,"and the"most useful" to men; he was thinkingof the art or the knowledgewhich is most concerned about clearness,precision, and the mosttrue, however little and of little use it might be.Socrates asksProtarchus to look neither at the usefulness nor at thereputationof the various sciences, but to consider whether there is apower inour souls which is in love with Truth and does everything forthesake of Truth. Would this power possess thoughtfulness(cppovnaic) and

votic in the greatest purity? Protarchus concedes that this mustbe so.To be in love with Truth does not mean to possess it or tocontemplateit. It means to pursue it, to try to find it,indefatigably, unremittingly; topursue it means to submit to thepower of discourse, a power that is ableto discover in the spokenor silent words that which make speaking andAbout Plato's Philebus179thinking ultimately possible, namely the unchangeable and,thereby, truebeings. But, as Socrates points out, the many existingarts and the menengaged in them do not submit to the power ofdiscourse, but are satisfiedwith their opinions. If a man sees fitto investigate nature, he spends hishfe in studying this world ofours that is to say, tries to find out how it

came into being, how it is acted upon and how it acts itself. Bydoingthat, that man toils to discover transient productions of thepresent, thefuture and the past, not what unchangeably always is.And Socrates asks:"How can we gain anything stable about thingswhich have no stabilitywhatsoever?"84 The argument compels us thusto see that the stable, pure,and true, can only be found in what iseternally the same without change ormixture or, Socratessurprisingly adds, "in what is most akin to it." 85 Hemav mean themoving, but never changing celestial bodies.

This passage which deals with the purest knowledge ends with therepeated reference to voiig and cpoovnoig, which have to be honoredmost.

This reference is the last transition in the dialogue to thelast passage ofthe dialogue.

This last passage is about the most desirable life, in whichthoughtfulness and pleasure are mixed. Socrates undertakes now tomake thismixture with the help of Protarchus. We expected and stillexpect that

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the pure pleasures and the purest knowledge will be joined inthis mixture.Before the mixing beeins, Socrates reminds Protarchusand us of whathad been said before. Philebus had claimed thatpleasure was the true goalof every living being and that these twowords,"good"and"pleasant,"mean the same thing. Socrates, on theother hand, claimed that "good"and"pleasant"mean different thingsand that the share of thoughtfulnessin the good is greater thanpleasure's. They had agreed, Socrates continues,that any livingbeing, in whom the good is present always, altogether, andin allways, has no further need of anything, but is perfectlyself-sufficient;but that neither a life of pleasure unmixed withthoughtfulness nor athoughtful life unmixed with pleasure was adesirable life.Directly related to the task of making the mixtureis the task ofwinning a clear understanding of the good in thewell-mixed life, or at

least an outline of it, 86 so as to be better able to find outto what in thewell-mixed life the second prize should be assigned.We remember thatSocrates had raised the question before. At thattime the possible recipientsof the second prize were voiig andpleasure. Note that in this last passageof the dialogue voiig hasnot been mentioned so far.

This is now what Socrates says jovially and playfully justbefore hebegins to make the mixture: "Let us make the mixture,Protarchus, witha proper prayer to the gods, Dionysus orHephaestus, or whoever he be84 59 B.85 59 C.86 61 A.180Interpretation

who presides over the mixing8.7"Dionysus leads on revellers andpresidesover orgies; he stands here for pleasure. Hephaestus isknown for histhoughtful and sober craftmanship. Socrates continues:"We are like winepourers, and beside us are fountains that ofpleasure may be hkened toa fount of honey, and the sober, winelessfount of thoughtfulness to oneof pure, health-giving water of whichwe must do our best to mix as weUas possible88."

The first question is: should Socrates and Protarchus mix allpleasurewith all thoughtfulness? Socrates observes that this wouldnot be safe. Itwould be better to mix first that pleasure which wasmore truly pleasure

with that knowledge which was most true and most precise.Protarchusagrees. But Socrates is not satisfied. Let us assume, hesays, a man whois thoughtful about justice itself, that is, aboutthe i8og of justice, and isguided in his reasoning about everythingthat truly is by his apprehensionof the intelligible, by his voeiv(it is the first time that vovc is mentioned inthis last passage ofthe dialogue). If this man is fully cognizant of themathematicalcircle and the all-embracing celestial sphere, but is ignorantofour human sphere and human circles, will this man havesufficientknowledge? No, says Protarchus, it would be ridiculousfor a man to beconcerned only with divine knowledge. "Do youmean,"Socrates asks,"that the unstable and impure art of the untruerule and circle is to beput with the other arts into the mixture?"89 Yes, says Protarchus, that is

necessary, if any man is ever to find his way home. Socrates andProtarchusgo further. They put music, which they said a while agowas fuU ofguesswork and lacked purity, and all the deficient kindsof knowledge

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mingling with the pure into the mixture.Then Socrates turns tothe pleasures. Here again the pure and truepleasures are not theonly ones to be put into the mixture. For the firstand only time inthe dialogue Socrates mentions "necessary pleasures,"90by which hemeans pleasures connected with the satisfaction of vital needs,andadds them to the pure ones. And the further question arises: is itnotadvantageous and harmless to let all pleasures be a part of themixture,

just as it was harmless and advantageous to let all the arts andall knowledge be such a part? Whereupon Socrates says: "There is nouse in askingus, Protarchus; we must ask the pleasures themselvesand the differentkinds of thoughtfulness about one another." 91That's what Socrates does.He asks first the pleasures: "Would youchoose to dwell with the wholeof thoughtfulness or with none atall?" 92 And Socrates lets them answerthat for any tribe to besolitary and unaUoyed is neither possible nor87 61 B/C.88 61 C.8862 B.ao 62 E.

si 63A/B.82 63 B.About Plato's Philebus 181profitable: "We thinkthe best to live with is the knowledge of all otherthings and, sofar as is possible, the perfect knowledge of ourselve9s3."Let usnot forget, it is Socrates whom we hear speaking. It ishighlydoubtful whether the pleasures can speak and can have anyknowledgeof themselves. And now Socrates turns to thoughtfulnessand voiig. (It isthe second time that voiig is mentioned in thislast passage of the dialogue.)Socrates asks them whether they wantthe greatest and most intensepleasures to dwell with them inaddition to the true and pure pleasures.And Socrates replies forthem that is, for thoughtfulness and voiig that

the true and pure pleasures are almost their own, and also thosewhichare united to health and self-restraint and all those whichare handmaidsof virtue; they should be added to the mixture; as tothe pleasures whichmadden the souls of men, which are thecompanions of folly and of aUthe other vices, it would be senselessto mix them with the voiig.

This is the third time that vo-ug is mentioned in the passage,whilethoughtfulness (cppovnaig), which was also addressed bySocrates, is leftout. When Socrates has finished replying in thename of both voiig andcppovnoig, he says to Protarchus: "Shall wenot say that this reply whichthe voiig has now made for itself andmemory and right opinion is thoughtful and sensible?" 94 AndProtarchus says: "Very much so."Which voiig

is this voiig? Is it the "divine that Socrates contrasted withhis ownin his reply to Philebus a long time ago? No, it is Socrateswho wasspeaking guided by his own voiig. It is not the voiig thatthe "easy"cosmological account found to be "the cause of all"andthat the sages, inexalting themselves, declare to be "king ofheaven and earth."It is notthe fourth tribe of the Promethean gift,which Socrates introduced, fearingto appear ridiculous by doingthat. Socrates'own voiig is responsible forthe kind of mixture hemakes to produce the life which combines thoughtfulness andpleasure, is the cause of this life. It is neither the cause ofthecommixture of the "limitless"and of the "limit,"

nor the cause of thesefirst two tribes of the Prometheangift.What does the original introduction of the voiig as the "causeof all"

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and the subsequent somewhat veiled rejection of this voiig mean?I thinkit means a subtle mocking of Plato's great pupil Aristotle.Aristotle'sthoughts must certainly have been familiar to Plato inhis late years. Apassage in an ancient manuscript,95 that informsus about Aristotle's life,hints at lively controversies betweenPlato and Aristotle. Plato appears tohave nicknamed Aristotle 6voiig, and to have once said, when Aristotlewas not present at ameeting: "The voiig is absent; dullness reigns in thelecture room."We do know that the investigation of the different meanings83 63B/C.84 64 A.ss Codex Marcianus. See Paul Friedlander's AkademischeRandglossen in DieGegenwart der Griechen im Neueren Denken,Festschrift fiir Hans-Georg Gadamer,I960, p. 317.182Interpretation

of cause (akta) and of the divine voiig plays a decisive role inAristotle'sworks. What the dialogue intimates is that voiig isabove all a humanpossession, and that Socrates is the embodiment ofthis voiig.

Socrates completes the mixture by pointing to the necessity thattruthmust be a part of it, and then asks what is the most preciousin it and thechief cause for this mixed life to be most lovable.The answer is: duemeasure and proportion which bring about beautyand excellence. Nobodyis ignorant of this. We should more properly,however, consider thesethree, beauty, truth, due measure, as thecomponents of the goodness ofthe mixture. We see, first: vovc ismore akin to truth than pleasure;secondly: nothing could be foundmore immoderate than pleasure andnothing is more in harmony withdue measure than voiig and knowledge;and thirdly: voiig has agreater share in beauty than pleasure.And now, finaUy, Socratesgives a list of the best human possessions intheir proper order.First something like Measure, Due Measure, Propriety,

and like everything which must be considered of the same order.Secondlycomes what is well proportioned, beautiful, has beencompleted and issufficient, and all that belongs to that veryfamily. Socrates continues: "Asto the third this is my prophecy ifyou insist on voiig and cppovnatg,you will not wander far from thetruth." 96 Is vong relegated to the thirdplace? No, it is elevatedto the proper rank, if you consider the role thetriad played in theentire dialogue. Fourthly come the different kinds ofknowledge, thearts, the true opinions; and fifthly the painless purepleasures ofthe soul, some of which accompany knowledge and some ofwhich as wehave seen accompany perceptions (observe that knowledgewas notmentioned before among the pure pleasures, presumably because

the pursuit of knowledge involves the desire to know, involvesEpcog, inwhich pain and pleasure are mixed). There is no sixthplace, says Socrates,quoting Orpheus. He reminds us that neithervoiic nor pleasure is the gooditself, since both are devoid ofself-sufficiency. But within the mixed life,which is the victor,voiig has now been given the second prize, whilepleasureasSocrates'own voiig had predicted a long time ago is furtherbehindthan the third place. Note that this holds even for purepleasureand that the satisfaction of vital needs is not mentionedat all. Pleasure isfifth. We should be aware that, according to thetradition, the peoplecalled "Pythagoreans"

associated the goddess Aphrodite with the numberfive.

The list given by Socrates is strangely unprecise andinordinate. It is

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indeed only an outline of the good in the most desirable life.The cbtapov,the "limitless," the "indeterminate,"reigns, though notsupremely, in thedialogue.I shall not keep you until midnight. Goodnight! But there wiU bea discussion.86 66 B.